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CHAPTER 1: MIDDLE-CLASS RESISTANCE TO PROLETARIANIZATION AND
NEOLIBERAL CRISIS FROM BUENOS AIRES TO WALL STREET 
Why is it always us who have to suffer?’ She yelled indignantly.  ‘The common people, the
lower middle class I mean.  If war is declared, if the Franc is devalued, if there is unemployment
or a revolution or any type of crisis, everyone else is able to work things out so that they land on
their feet.  We are the ones who end up getting crushed! We always pay for everyone else’s
mistakes.’ Enraged, she continued; ‘Of course they don't fear us.  The workers fight back, the
rich are powerful.  We are the lambs to the slaughter. 
Irene Nemirovsky, French Suite, 2007
We are living through extraordinary political times. In the aftermath of what the IMF (2009)
described as the deepest global depression since the Great Depression of the 1930s, millions of
‘ordinary people’ from the squeezed middle class1 are taking to the streets to engage in rebellion
against  acute  declines  in  their  material  conditions  and  to  demand  greater  democratic
accountability. Whilst set in Nazi-occupied France in the 1940s, the quote from Nemirovsky’s
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novel above expresses not only many of the frustrations of those in the middle class at the time,
but also the myth of middle-class docility in the face of adversity- that had become internalised
among  such  citizens  over  decades  and  which  continued  to  exist  until  her  book’s  year  of
publication (2007). This, was also the eve of an internationalized middle-class revolt when from
North America to Europe, to Australasia and Latin America to the Middle East, they started to
fight back collectively against the seemingly perpetual ‘age of austerity’, shrinking public sector
spending and fundamental  welfare state  reform which,  combined and linked to  processes of
neoliberal globalization such as outsourcing, labor flexibilization, deskilling, the replacement of
highly-qualified jobs  with  technology and social  costs  including rising  divorce rates  left  the
middle-class  facing  an  existential  crisis.   The  revolt  ended  this  myth  of  docility  but  these
processes have seen middle-class citizens experience eroding household incomes and real-terms
salaries,  decimated  pensions,  unemployment,  declining  social  mobility  and  increasing  job
insecurity. For a decade politicians, economists and sociologists have evoked the spectre of the
disappearance  of  the  middle  class.  This  possibility  has  intensified  since  the  2007 sub-prime
mortgage crash and credit crunch in North America (Warren, 2007). While in July 2016 the UK’s
Institute for Fiscal Studies reported that “middle income families with children now more closely
resemble the poor than in the past.” In the global north many - especially the young - have had
enough of  the  broken promises  that  obtaining  a  degree  and working hard will  land them a
prosperous future. For instance, in 2013 unemployment rates peaked at 64% and 53% in Greece
and Spain respectively according to Eurostat. Meanwhile in the global south, the contradiction
between growing choices  as  consumers in  the free-market  and limited  political  freedoms as
citizens has become increasingly stark. In both cases it has unleashed rebellion and sometimes
even revolution (Mason, 2012). 
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Whilst accompanied by traditional industrial unrest in several national contexts, it has been the
highly-educated, yet unemployed or low income-earning ‘squeezed’ urban middle-class citizens
who have participated and often spearheaded these movements. Among these global uprisings
are the Indignados protest camps in Spain, the Kínima Aganaktisménon-Politón demonstrations
in Syntagma Square and across Greece, the Occupy Wall Street movement in the USA (all since
2011), the Gezi Park occupation and protests in Turkey in 2013, mass strikes and demonstrations
in France, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Russia (2011-2018) and most remarkably - the Arab
Spring (2011- ) which actually toppled governments in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.2 Each national
movement has manifest a number of characteristics that involve the resurgence and renewal of
historic  collective  repertoires  of  action  in  contemporary  form,  including  the  occupation  of
‘public space’ as a protest method, innovative, non-hierarchical, horizontal organising structures
and direct democracy. The ‘assembly’ and consensus-building have become the key decision-
making mechanisms and the initial rejection of interference by political parties or other forms of
institutionalization is a further cross-national feature (Parkinson, 2012). 
Once these movements have won initial concessions from political elites or it has been repressed
or defeated, their subsequent trajectories usually involved demobilization, morphing into small-
scale  community  projects  or  political  fragmentation  in  the  longer-term.  Their  lack  of  a
sustainable mobilising vehicle after mass, multi-sectoral collective actions following periods of
political or economic crisis is a key factor in this demobilization, with the possible exception of
Spain, where Podemos became the home of many participants in the Indignados protests (2011)
and  has  become  part  of  the  political  landscape.  In  Iceland  participants  in  the  Kitchenware
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Revolution that overthrew the Geir Haarde government in early-2009 following its political and
financial crisis, were central to re-writing the national constitution which was voted on by the
population.  These  demands  were  soon institutionalized  and  established  the  blueprint  for  the
country’s social, political and economic renaissance.  
Meanwhile the limitations and dangers faced by such movements in terms of their impact on
high politics are demonstrated by the capitulation of the Syriza government in Greece which
began as a ‘movement of the squares’ but whose hopes following the extraordinarily brave “Oxi”
referendum vote (which rejected the bailout conditions as a solution to the government’s debt
crisis),  was  eventually  crushed  by  the  European  Commission,  International  Monetary  Fund
(IMF)  and  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB).  Meanwhile  in  the  United  States,  the  initial
excitement generated by Occupy Wall Street genuinely helped to re-shape political discourse in
terms of the need to drastically reduce acute social inequality, the power of the corporations over
citizens  lives’  and  for  urgent  environmental  action.  This  was  encapsulated  in  the  election
campaign of Bernie Sanders but which eventually petered out with the election of President
Donald  Trump  and  the  return  of  right-wing  populism.  Nevertheless,  some of  the  economic
demands were translated (or perhaps co-opted) onto the new administration’s anti-neoliberal,
protectionist and counter-political establishment agenda. 
Whilst numerous texts have analyzed the mobilization and demobilization of these cross-national
movements (Chomsky, 2012; Della Porta, 2017; Weiner and López, 2018), this book is different.
It  focuses  specifically  on  the  question  of  how middle-class  citizens  deal  with  dramatic  and
sudden  declines  in  material  wellbeing  and  the  threat  of  proletarianization  following  either
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external economic or internal financial shocks. It then asks why, under such circumstances, some
become politicized and resist by joining social movements and collective actions while others
confine their responses to individual coping strategies.
Based upon analysis of survey data of those who were originally pauperized during its political
and economic crisis in 2001-02, embeddedness in middle-class communities, observation and
interviews with non-activist middle-class citizens during a field study in 2007, 2011 and 2016,
Argentina is adopted as a case study. Its citizens’ rebellion during 2001-02 becomes the focus
and the book adopts a Gramscian approach, using his theories of hegemony, ideology and false
consciousness, to detail the results of this mixed methods sociological study into proletarianized
or struggling middle-class participation in contemporary protest movements. This twelve-year
project  charts  the  trajectories  of  a  group  of  what  the  literature  calls  “new urban  poor,”  or
struggling middle-class citizens. It explores the political, economic and cultural decisions they
took along with their social attitudes and political involvement and how they fluctuated over
time. Interview participants also reflect on their memories of the social uprisings of the time and
their  own involvement.  Whilst  avoiding the  pitfalls  of  methodological  individualism,  it  also
draws upon other elements of social movement theory to analyze the in-group responses of this
stratum and the diachronic patterns  of  behavior  they  have pursued in  Argentina.  It  seeks  to
understand  how  participants  made  sense  of  their  own  pauperization  and  downward  social
mobility, how aspects of their “rights” that that this citizenship bestowed were being violated and
how this affected their social attitudes, opinions, own position vis-à-vis other social sectors and
ultimately political  activism. It  also seeks their  reflections  upon the 2001-02 revolt  so as  to
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identify whether the radical ideals it espoused were still advocated by participants many years
later or if they draw more critical understandings of them.
It is clear is that those at the forefront of political resistance against the worst excesses of the
financial crisis in recent years are no longer simply the organized labor movement or the socially
disenfranchized. Although the wave of industrial unrest in China (the country with the world’s
largest working class) since 2010 and the UK riots by marginalized sectors in 2011 demonstrate
that these both remain important respective actors in terms of social contention, those from the
middle  class  who  have  either  recently  become  poor  or  who  are  currently  unemployed  or
underemployed, form a significant and growing political force on the streets and in public space.
The struggling middle class as political agents
New urban poor citizens have not traditionally been understood as political agents, nor have they
been studied in terms of their political radicalization or collective identity as a social stratum.
Indeed,  ever  since  its  conceptualization  as  an  area  of  academic  research  three  decades  ago,
studies have focused almost entirely on their individual self-improvement strategies (Katzman
1989,  Minujín  et  al.  1993).   A range  of  disciplinary  approaches  have  been  employed  to
understand  how  middle-class  individuals  cope  with  impoverishment  and  proletarianization.
Work has  assessed  the  psychological  (Masseroni  and Sauane 2002),  cultural,  civic  (Minujín
2007;  Adamovsky,  2009)  and  above  all  economic  behavior  they  exhibit.  For  instance
Dagdeviren, Donoghue and Meier (2017) noted that in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis in Europe,
the ‘new poor’ were poorly equipped to cope with their newfound pauperization and rapid social
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descent relative to traditionally impoverished communities. They were often more stigmatized
and hid their difficulties due to the sense of shame. 
‘Economic’ responses themselves may take one of two forms, either as ‘adaptive’ responses - for
example how consumer behavior is modified to cope with macroeconomic meltdown (Feijóo
2003; Zurawicki and Braidot 2005) - or ‘active’ strategies by which human, social and cultural
capitals accumulated during their non-poor pasts, are utilized to either explore self-employment
opportunities (Feijóo 2003; Kessler and Di Virgilio 2008), or utilize social networks to gain labor
market advantages (Lokshin and Yemtsov, 2004).  Some work has found that those with the
strongest qualifications, networks, communication skills and money often enjoy least success in
refashioning their lives after pauperization and unemployment (Gabriel et al, 2013), especially if
they  accept  dominant  discourses  about  age  and ‘irreversible  decline’ (Ainsworth  and Hardy,
2009).  Meanwhile, Mandemakers and Monden, (2013:73) found that losing a high-status job
may restrict the practical value of the resources one possesses due to the stress incurred. 
Kessler  and Di  Virgilio’s eminent  (2008)  study of  the  extent  to  which  newly impoverished
middle-class  citizens  are  able  to  utilize  their  superior  social  and cultural  capitals  (that  were
accumulated during their non-poor pasts) to recover their socio-economic status once they have
become pauperized helped to frame understanding about how these differ to those of the long-
term poor. Later, Ozarow (2015) found that these capitals may actually act as ‘poisoned chalices’
in terms of recovering upward mobility and financial recovery. 
However, these studies have neglected to examine how and why poverty and proletarianization is
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also resisted through engagement in collective and protest responses, especially during periods of
economic crisis (Richards and Gelleny, 2006:777).  Indeed, the post-crisis milieu suggests that
protest  responses  are  actually  widely  practiced  as  a  reaction  against  social  descent  and
pauperization. Therefore, instead of focusing exclusively on their economic self-improvement
responses, this book seeks to understand why citizens do not merely react to their deteriorating
personal  circumstances  that  financial  shocks cause  by acting  solely  as  economic agents  and
rational decision makers who carry out private and economic responses, as neoliberal advocates
assume.  
The focus here is on the domestic agitation (collective protest) that such crises provoke, and on
asking  why  and  how  newly  impoverished  or  proletarianized  people  decide  to  join  protest
movements to confront their descent. 
Myths of domination
Until the 2008 global crisis, the prevalence of two myths has meant that the potential for protest
responses from the middle class against their hardship was rendered unnecessary and irrelevant
for so-called Western societies.  Equally these myths were propagated by politicians, mass media
and  other  cultural  institutions  and  so  served  to  limit  the  possibilities  for  affected  citizens
themselves  to  protest  their  deteriorating  economic  conditions.  This  resulted  in  collective
responses faded from the sociological imagination.
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The first of these myths was that of the ‘eternal economic boom’. It was declared that in the
advanced capitalist economies, major macroeconomic shocks had become a thing of the past. If
there  were  therefore  no  grounds  to  suppose  that  sudden  and  widespread  outbreaks  of
impoverishment  could occur, nor could mass  political  resistance to  capitalism.  For  example,
following sixteen successive years of annual growth in the US and UK between 1993 and 2008,
it was widely believed among politicians, academics and economists that the US-led housing
market bubble and deficit-led boom would continue unabated in the West (Wade, 2009b).  When
the sub-prime mortgage crisis began to hit the financial sector, Alan Greenspan, Head of the
Federal Reserve admitted that he ‘really didn’t get it until late in 2005’. Whilst on the other side
of the Atlantic, between the two of them alone, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and
then Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown publicly made no less than sixteen separate
references  to  the  fact  that  the  Labor  Government  had  ‘ended  the  cycle  of  boom and bust’
between 1997 and 2007 (HM Treasury Records; House of Commons Hansard Archive and Labor
Party Annual Conference Archive).  
However, the credibility of this myth disintegrated during the current global economic crisis.
Moreover, based on the premises that i)  the impact of the crisis  is  expected to endure for a
generation,  in  the  form of  low-growth in  Western  societies  according to  the  IMF (2015) ii)
soaring national debt will lead public spending cuts in the long term, it is almost certain that
conspicuous  consumption  –  a  key  tenet  of  middle-class  identity  construction  –  will  be
significantly curtailed for a generation.  According to a recent Eurostat report (2015), 24% of the
EU’s non-poor population (or 122 million citizens) are currently at  risk of poverty or social
exclusion, in addition to the 9% who are already materially deprived.  
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The second myth was of middle-class political docility. It was believed that even if something
were  to  go ‘terribly  wrong’ and the  middle  class  were  to  experience  mass  pauperization  or
downward  mobility,  they  would  ‘go  quietly’ unlike  the  organized  working  class,  confining
themselves  to  private  and  passive  response  measures.   Extra-parliamentary  middle-class
discontent would be channelled through campaigning structures such as established NGOs or
would be reduced to protest voting at elections.  For example, as illustrated by the June 2008
Euromonitor International Report (Eghbal, 2008) on how Western Europe’s middle class has
been  squeezed  by  inflation,  stagnant  wages  and  the  credit  crunch  concluded  that  because
‘middle-class workers’ are less likely to be trade union members, they ‘are most likely to express
their frustration through the ballot box.’ 
Neo-liberalism and its advocates understand humans as exclusively rational economic agents and
thus  they  tend to  ignore  or  dismiss  the  social  and political  impacts  of  economic  shocks  by
focusing purely on economic coping strategies at individual or household level.  Arguments by
those such as Phelps Brown (1990) who has suggested that there has been a shift away from the
principles  of  collectivism  toward  acquisitive  individualism  in  terms  of  how  people  defend
themselves against attacks on their material conditions, need to be scrutinized. Firstly due to their
selectivity in national examples that they refer to in reaching such a conclusion.  
Cross-national contextual differences can help explain whether pauperized middle-class citizens
display a  tendency to respond to their  circumstances in  terms of  either  self-improvement  or
protest actions. This can depend upon the extent to which the respective ruling elites are able to
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enact defensive strategies of control in order to maintain consent to rule from the population.  To
use Hirschman’s terminology (1970),  it  must  be noted that  the preference for the struggling
middle class enact ‘loyalty actions’ (those that support the existing regime by seeking to preserve
the status quo) or ‘exit actions’ (whereby citizens merely adapt to the changing situation in a
politically  ‘passive’ way),  rather  than  ‘voice  responses’–  by  which  they  actively  speak  out
against the policy of the ruling regime, or oppose it through protest – can largely be explained by
the mitigating power structures and political processes that are specific to national context in
question.  
Cross-national middle-class resistance 
Certainly, national cases exist whereby the mass pauperization of the middle class has been met
with political docility. For example, in South Africa in the post-Apartheid era and in particular in
light of the 1998 Employment Equity Act. The hundreds of thousands of White ‘new urban poor’
citizens who lost their jobs as a result of this ‘affirmative action’ legislation which imposed a
legal obligation upon companies to favor Black job applicants, were paradoxically greeted with
‘anticipatory compliance,’ despite causing great anxiety and resentment (Kanya, 1997:32).  Far
from outwardly protesting their  anger, the overwhelming response from highly-skilled,  white
professional South Africans came in the form of ‘exit strategies,’ namely emigration or early
retirement.  Between 1995 and 2005, according to a survey by the Institute of Race Relations,
more than one million South Africans emigrated, citing the lack of employment opportunities for
whites as a key reason.  However, this  lack of political resistance to confront their  collective
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downward social  mobility needs to be contextualized in a society where these policies were
universally comprehended and respected as a remedial strategy to address the legal and historical
exclusion of the black majority.  
Meanwhile in Russia, both following the fall of the Berlin Wall and transition to capitalism after
1991 and in the wake of its 1998 financial  crisis, a significant part  of the middle class was
afflicted by the painful experience of proletarianization. Yet, the defensive strategies which were
enacted by the ruling elite (to break the public sector strikes and roadblocks by teachers, doctors,
scientists  and  other  professionals)  included  a  combination  of  physical  coercion  with
appeasement. Compromise figure, Yvgeny Primakov was appointed as Prime Minister in 1998 in
order to unite the country’s political elites and weaken resistance during the latter period.  In
addition,  the fundamentally minimalist  form of democracy that evolved during the transition
from state communism to capitalism in Russia has resulted in a weak civil society emerging and
acute lack of available opportunities for the struggling middle class to manifest their political
discontent.  A lack of credible alternatives to capitalism – given the discrediting of communism –
and an overriding sense of powerlessness (due to the geographical vastness of the country, a lack
of suitable mobilising vehicles and the relative popularity of President Putin, who was initially
appointed as Prime Minister in 1999) led to widespread alienation among the country’s new
urban poor and struggling middle class. Many of those in these ranks had held middle or high-
ranking Communist  Party positions  (effectively the social  elite  under  the USSR) or roles  in
public sector professions who had been made redundant after 1991. Rather than fuelling action,
discontent with their own quality of life after the 1998 crisis translated into either self-blame or
political  apathy among Russian citizens who principally sought and continue to seek private
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solutions to collective problems.  It was found that only three percent were prepared to join a
protest  march  at  the  time  and  just  eight  percent  would  sign  a  petition.  Where  ‘voice’ was
expressed, it was manifest ‘silently,’ through the ballot box by 25% of those surveyed (Willie,
2001:222). 
However,  evidence  from  numerous  other  countries  in  recent  years  demonstrates  that
impoverished  middle-class  citizens  do  engage  in  political  protest  actions  alongside  simply
pursuing economic self-improvement strategies.  These multiple instances of mass protest places
Phelps Brown’s argument into doubt. For example Iceland was the most developed country in the
world in 2007 (UN Human Development Index) and its people were the happiest (World Values
Survey, 2006). Median household income was almost US$70,000 - 1.6 times that in the United
States and there was a weak political culture of largescale protest movements, other than over
contingent issues such as the 1975 women’s strike.  Largely due to its sheer affluence, it seemed
like the last place in the world to expect a middle-class uprising. Yet in late 2008, plagued by
economic meltdown, and collapse of its three major banks, tens of thousands lost their savings,
became unemployed or plunged into poverty as salaries plummeted, the currency devalued and
an IMF stabilization plan was implemented. Yet under the umbrella campaign group ‘Voices of
the People’, 10,000 largely impoverished m/class regularly took to streets during late 2008 and
2009 and this culturally placid people overthrew the Government. In a country of just 315,000
people this size of protest is the equivalent of 2 million in the UK of 10 million in the United
States. These protests became known as the Kitchenware Revolution because of the symbolic
banging of saucepans, a practice adopted from Argentina which has become a symbol of middle
class  resistance  to  impoverishment  (Wade,  2009a).  The  rebellion  in  Iceland  also  shocked
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Europe’s ruling elites who finally started to realize that they couldn’t take struggling middle-
class docility for granted, prompting France’s then-President Nicolas Sarkozy to exclaim “we
can’t have a European May 68’ for Christmas!” (Phillips, 2008).
The Indignados movement made up of largely white-collar, young and highly qualified people
who occupied city squares throughout Spain in 2011 and 2012, and the rebellion against austerity
and pauperization in Greece, are other cases in point that have laid this second myth of middle-
class  docility  to  rest.   The  cases  of  Argentina,  Iceland,  Spain  and  Greece  indicate  that  as
Galbraith  warned  in  The  Culture  of  Contentment (1992),  the  middle  class  in  industrialized
societies will only continue to tolerate gross income inequality and the prolonged destitution of
what he called ‘the functional underclass’ for as long as it was in their self-interests to do so.
Further, Latin America’s recent history demonstrates that struggling middle-class citizens do not
simply  resign  themselves  to  their  deteriorating  economic  circumstances  by  seeking  self-
improvement  measures,  but  join  collective  protest  movements  too.  For  example,  Venezuela
experienced its  own episode of  new poor radicalism.   When the neoliberal  reforms that  were
implemented by President Carlos Andrés Pérez in the 1990s pushed hundreds of thousands into
poverty, the limited availability of self-help opportunities including employment,  increased the
relative attractiveness of protest as a response for its pauperized and jobless middle class. Many
frequently participated in road blocks, building occupations and other collective protest actions. 
This  situation  has  repeated  itself  during  the  severe  economic  crisis  and  hyperinflation  to  hit
Venezuela  under  President  Nicolas  Maduro's  governments  since  2013,  with  thousands  of
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struggling middle class citizens joining mass anti-government protests, including the sporadic use
of violence. Meanwhile in Uruguay’s own economic crisis in 2002/3, the new poor, especially
those who lost savings, were also at the forefront of its protest movement. In Brazil, the largescale
protests  against  the  Confederation  Cup  in  2013  (sparked  by  an  increase  in  bus  fares)  then
broadened in their  demands in  subsequent  years  to  target  the public  money spent  on the  Rio
Olympics,  alleged  corruption  former  President  'Lula'  Da  Silva  and  President  Dilma  Rouseff
against whom impeachment charges were sought. Amidst an economic crisis, the millions who
took part included a significant proportion of middle-class protestors who were struggling to make
ends meet).
Why Argentina?
In January 2002, signs mysteriously began to appear in the Villa 31 shanty town in Buenos Aires
ironically proclaiming “welcome middle class!” During its 2001 economic crisis, the largest ever
national debt default in history occurred when unemployment reached 25%, GDP fell by a fifth
and  poverty  soared  to  54%  (INDEC).  Millions  of  mainly  highly-educated  citizens  became
impoverished and the middle class was virtually extinguished overnight. Yet the economic crisis
was accompanied by a crisis of political representation. Many of the struggling middle class
participated in the enormous popular revolt and protest movement in the year that followed and
Argentina became the ideological forbearer of all these multisectoral but struggling middle-class
led counter-neoliberal resistance movements. The country soon became an incubator for radical
experiments in direct democracy, horizontal decision-making, the occupation of public space and
citizens’ self-management in what was known as the ‘que se vayan todos’ [Get rid of the lot of
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them] revolt, the popular cry during the birth of the movement on the streets of Argentina’s urban
centres  on  19th and  20th December  2001 and which  removed four  presidents  in  two weeks.
Amidst the chaos and trauma, there lay hope.
There was widespread recognition that the neoliberal model of President Carlos Menem (1989-
99) and then Fernando De La Rua’s (1999-2001) governments had been a disaster given the
misery  and  inequality  they  had  generated.  The  corruption-ridden,  representative  democratic
system had been exhausted  as  a  project,  and  the  bourgeoning  protest  movements  sought  to
replace  this  model  with  a  fairer,  more  participatory  society  based  around  social  solidarity
(Adamovsky, 2009).  Intriguingly, the organising strategies,  tactics and symbolic  middle-class
tools of protest that came to life during those days were subsequently adopted in the autonomist-
inspired  uprisings  which  later  emerged  in  Wall  Street,  Greece,  Spain,  Iceland,  Turkey  and
elsewhere. 
In Argentina’s urban centres, narratives of contention and the performance of class among new
poor citizens were represented in popular chants, cacerolazos [pots and pans protests] and in the
neighborhood  assemblies’  discourse.  These  focused  around  solidarity  with  ‘the  other’;  in
particular between progressive elements of the middle class and structurally poor and working-
class  movements,  including  the  piqueteros  [unemployed  workers  movement]  (Svampa  and
Corral, 2006).
As shall be elaborated upon later, what made Argentina’s revolt unique was how the scale of
economic misery and collapse of political legitimacy generated widespread solidarity between
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millions of previously un-politicized, struggling middle-class citizens with blue-collar workers,
unemployed  and  long-term  impoverished  sectors.  It  was  arguably  the  closest  instance  of  a
bottom-up,  leaderless  attempt  at  revolution  in  modern  times.  As  a  heterogeneous actor  both
socio-economically and also politically, there were of course many within the middle class who
took part in the collective actions of the 1990s, 2001-02, and the major protests of 2003-2018
and others who didn’t at all. However, some generalizations can be inferred.
Although many among the struggling middle-class ranks (particularly teachers, civil servants and
small and medium-sized business owners) had participated in protest movements against IMF-
imposed conditionality that entailed structural adjustment in return for loans during the 1990s,
(Adamovsky, 2009), the turning point that transformed many non-activists to join the protests
came when President De la Rúa declared a State of Siege on 19th December 2001 in response to
widespread lootings and food riots, especially in Greater Buenos Aires.  However, his decision
merely  served  to  evoke  memories  of  the  despized  civil-military  dictatorship  (1976-83),
prompting hundreds of thousands of citizens, (including many pauperized middle-class citizens)
to spill out onto the streets to express their fury as the economic crisis descended into a crisis of
political legitimacy. Demanding the overthrow of the entire political establishment, the following
two  days  marked  the  first  major  Cacerolazo protests,  which  were  neither  pre-planned  nor
organized by any particular political party or trade union.3 Despite the brutal reaction of the state
and the murder of thirty nine protestors by the riot police and shop owners, as portrayed in the
moving documentary  39 El Documental, Las Víctimas de 2001 (Dir. Velásquez, 2017), it was
during  these  events  that  many  Argentineans  experienced  an  epiphany  about  the  power  of
collective action.  De la Rúa was infamously forced to flee the demonstrators in a helicopter
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from the roof of the  Casa Rosada (Presidential Palace) and promptly resigned from office the
following day.  
These protests helped to spark many cross-class, grassroots forms of community organization
throughout  2002  as  the  collapse  in  confidence  of  the  country’s  political  system led  to  the
establishment  of  hundreds  of  neighborhood  assemblies  in  Argentina’s  main  cities  (Nueva
Mayoría, 2006), in which citizens actively participated in horizontal, political decision-making at
a local level and discussed solutions to the local and national problems that their  politicians
could not resolve.  Ongoing street protests, community kitchens, participation in counter-cultural
movements as well as a surge in the level of participation in barter clubs - 5,356 clubs were
formed around the country and were used by three millions citizens in 2002 alone (Gomez and
Helmsing, 2008:2496) as the post-default nation faced an acute liquidity crisis.  Argentinians
didn’t just protest against a government or a system, but they lived out the changes they wanted
to see through their participation in solidarity economy actions and acts of direct democracy.
Meanwhile, just weeks earlier, millions had also demonstrated their indignation at the ballot box
with half of voters either spoiling their ballot papers, abstaining completely (in a country where
voting is obligatory) or voting for revolutionary left-wing parties during the legislative elections
of October 2001. The protest movements were characterized by an expansive political edge and
were inspired by an exceptional  atmosphere of  political  discord and the  ideas  of  autonomy,
removal  of  hierarchy  and  the  promotion  of  horizontal  decision-making  rather  than  solely
economic  need.   As  scores  of  bankrupt  factories  and  workplaces  were  taken  over  by  their
employees and ‘recovered’ under worker’s control and  piqueteros blocked roads and bridges
daily around the country, the insurrectionary mood that permeated society led the ruling elites to
18
take fright that the country was on the verge of revolution.  In this book I stop short of arguing
that Argentina’s 2001-02 uprisings represented a revolutionary situation. No situation of dual-
power existed at the time (Astarita, 2008), despite attempts to construct an Inter-Neighborhood
Assembly  in  order  to  coordinate  the  local-level  assemblies  and  expand  its  territorialized
presence. 
However, in subsequent years through a blend of initial repression (2001-02), protest fatigue,
implosion  of  certain  movements,  state  co-optation  by  the  left-wing  governments  of  Nestor
Kirchner (2003-07) and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2008-2015) and a rapid improvement in
the  macroeconomic  and  political  climate,  the  resistance  melted  away.  While  many  in  the
struggling middle class supported Nestor and early stages of Cristina’s governments, a gradual
shift in political tectonic plates led lower middle-class sectors to mobilize in enormous numbers
in a series of protests in 2004 and 2006 (the anti-crime Blumberg protests), the countryside crisis
protests of 2008 and then the mass anti-government protests of 2012 and 2013. 
In contrast to the 2001 uprisings, the latter abandoned the hope of achieving a wide-ranging
societal  transformation.  The  movement  goals  of  solidarity  and  the  construction  of  new
democratic, participatory and horizontal economic and political structures were replaced by a
narrower focus on indicting reformist-Peronist President Cristina Kirchner who they accused of
corruption and authoritarianism. Internal enemies such as ‘the poor’ were blamed for the nation’s
problems,  replacing  the  entire  political  establishment,  globalization  and  the  IMF  who  were
deemed  to  be  the  culprits  in  2001-02).  Materialistic  concerns,  such  as  ending  inflation  and
currency controls,  became key demands in  2012,  reflective  of  the higher  presence of  upper
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middle-class citizens in 2012 compared to 2001. As with 2001, the protests themselves remained
non-party  political,  self-organized  and  centred  on  the  cacerolazos. However,  this  time  they
occurred  during  a  period  of  comparative  economic  stability,  low  unemployment  and  acute
political  polarization.  While  the  objectives  were  very  different,  the  protests  symbolized  that
many of  the preoccupations  of 2001,  such as  a perceived lack of democratic  accountability,
corruption and lack of faith in the political establishment, had remained unresolved (Svampa,
2012). 
The book therefore explains how the widespread and progressive insurrectionary movements of
2001 and 2002 (led by the struggling middle class) were eventually tamed and why the class
solidarity  that  permeated society at  the  time disintegrated  and was actually  followed by the
proliferation of reactionary politics among a significant part of Argentina’s middle sectors. This
tendency  increased  under  the  three  Kirchner  governments  (2003-15)  until,  eventually,  as  a
culmination  of  this  gradual  retreat  towards  conservatism,  millionaire  businessman,  Maurico
Macri was parachuted to the Presidency in December 2015 on a neoliberal and conservative
ticket. The epitome of everything that the ‘losers’ of 1990s neoliberalism and the 2001 economic
crisis  had opposed a decade and a  half  earlier, many of  those who voted for him had been
sympathetic to or even actively participated in the Argentinazo.4 Argentina therefore allows us to
examine the full cycle of contentious politics and to explore how and why citizens supported
seemingly contrasting political and economic projects at different times.
The  Argentinean  social  and  economic  crisis  of  2001-02  has  therefore  been  chosen  as  the
principal case study country to explain both how middle-class citizens resist proletarianization
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for a variety of reasons.  First of all,  the scale of its mass pauperization is unparalleled in a
capitalist liberal democracy in recent times (Grimson and Kessler, 2005:87). 7.3 million well-
educated, often affluent small-business owners, public sector workers, professionals and other
highly-skilled  workers  fell  below the poverty  line  and entered unemployment  or  low-skilled
work in the space of a year (INDEC, 2018). 
Secondly, in terms of its relevance for the study of new urban poverty in the global north and
thus responses to it, Argentina shares many contextual, historical and institutional features with
other advanced capitalist economies. To start with, as mentioned earlier the characteristics of the
protest movements that its new poor citizens participated in closely match those of post-2008
crisis Europe and North America.  Many of the repertoires of collective action that have been
proliferated or revived, including the occupation of ‘public space,’ involvement in innovative,
non-hierarchical, horizontal organising structures, the general assembly and consensus-building
as key decision-making mechanisms along with the rejection of interference by political parties
or other forms of institutionalization (Parkinson, 2012) have been adapted from those created in
Argentina a decade ago. The country became the first in recent times where these repertoires
were practiced on a mass scale as Argentina became a laboratory for a range of social economy
experiments during what sociologist Maristella Svampa (2005) describes as the “extraordinary
year” of 2002.
The performance of middle-class discontent in 2001-02, often in the form of  cacerolazos, was
depicted by the media and academic studies as “spontaneous”, “autonomous” of political parties,
“peaceful”, and territorialized in the neighborhood vicinity. Thus, the pots and pans protests soon
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came to also symbolize middle-class resistance during subsequent protests in Argentina, as they
did in Iceland (2008-9), Spain (2011-2015) and Greece (2011-2012) in their respective middle
class-led uprisings. Carrying saucepans during protests allowed citizens to express their anger
with the government, whilst saving face regarding any personal financial difficulties they were
experiencing.  Through  the  cacerolazos  they  could  enunciate  their  individual  middle-class
identity through a distinct protest repertoire which distinguished them from trade union, blue-
collar or unemployed citizens’ groups.
Like Argentina,  new urban impoverishment  in  Western Europe and North America  not  only
occurred  within  the  context  of  economic  crisis,  but  also  one  of  political  legitimacy.  Their
deteriorating living conditions, concern for their future occupational prospects, sense of having
been abandoned by their political representatives and by the failure of representative democracy
to respond to their preoccupations. This perceived growing schism between the demands of the
people  and  the  actions  of  their  national  governments  and  political  institutions  -  which  are
increasingly believed to be acting in the interests of multinational corporations, wealthy elites
and global capital instead of the citizens who elect them, is made explicit in the 2011 Manifesto
of the Real Democracy Now! Movement in Spain5 and the Declaration of the Occupation of New
York  City  by  Occupy  Wall  Street6 for  instance.  The  consequence  of  three  decades  of  neo-
liberalism has been to generate a market-driven society whereby cultural and social production is
increasingly subject to the process of commodification. 
Yet,  despite  modern  capitalism’s ever  expanding  obsession  with  being  able  to  offer  greater
choices  economically  (increasingly differentiated goods and services available for consumers),
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socially  (greater  tolerance  of  one’s religion  or  sexuality),  and  culturally (a  wider  variety  of
options for educating one’s children etc.), citizens are also confronted with a stark contradiction
in  terms  of  their  narrowing  political choices.  Narratives  and  proposed  solutions  offered  by
political parties, and presidential and parliamentary candidates from different political traditions,
have interestingly coalesced around a neoliberal consensus that only seems to be concerned with
the ‘one percent’. Thus the growth of these movements has been borne out of this contradiction
and  rapidly  developed  into  a  crisis  of  political  legitimacy  among  increasing  sectors  of  the
population  in  countries  like  Italy,  Greece  and  Spain,  most  similar  to  that  which  Argentina
experienced a decade earlier. Argentina thus provides clues about what could happen to the same
movements in countries in the global north and the political and financial trajectories of their
struggling middle-class citizenry, albeit that they occurred within a specific national context and
in a country in a different part of the global production chain.
Thirdly, like North America and most of Europe, Argentina is a G20 member state that boasts a
deeply  entrenched  welfare  state  tradition  and  is  one  of  the  few  nations  in  the  southern
hemisphere that (even today) has a significant middle-class population.   The impact that the
retreat of the state has had in terms of the consequent downward social mobility of part of a once
thriving middle class draws many parallels with the experience of Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) economies (membership of which Argentina formally
requested in June 2018). 
Fourthly, Argentina’s political and industrial relations structures also have much in common with
those  in  the  Old  Continent.   These  enable  or  constrain  spaces  for  its  people  to  respond  to
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pauperization  both  politically  and in  terms  of  self-improvement  mechanisms in  comparative
ways.   The Peronist  blueprint  for the country’s hegemonic corporatist  mediating relationship
between labor, business and state institutions that prevails today was based on the Italian and
German corporatism that preceded it in the 1930s, and persists today as an industrial relations
model.  In  particular,  the  historic  alignment  between  the  Confederación  General  de  Trabajo
(CGT) union confederation7 and the Justicialista (Peronist) Party purposely replicates the British
Labour Party’s relationship with the Trade Union Congress (TUC) (Rock, 1991:69). 
Further, Argentina’s profound political and economic crisis occurred in 2001, and was followed
by a decade of almost uninterrupted high growth (2003-2013) before flattening out (2014-2017).
The depth of  the initial  crisis  is  similar  to  Spain and Greece’s,  however  the strength of  the
subsequent recovery makes Argentina an interesting case for longitudinal analysis. The three sets
of in-depth interviews conducted over a decade with the sample group provide us a seldom-
available  opportunity  to  examine  the  attitudes,  political  opinions  and  actions  of  citizens  at
different stages in the economic cycle. Such data is not yet possible to obtain in post-2008 crisis-
affected countries.
Finally, the participation of  the Argentina’s struggling  middle  class  in  protest  movements  in
2001-02 took place in relative international isolation compared to the more recent episodes of
new urban poor rebellion in Europe and North America.  This makes it an especially useful case
study  because  political  mobilization  under  pauperization  was  not  influenced  by  a  global
contagion  of  resistance,  as  more  recent  movements  are  (Mason,  2012).  In  the  absence  of
exogenous contributing factors such as these, the findings may be more generalizable to different
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country contexts.
The importance of this book
In the wake of the worldwide economic and political crisis since 2008 there has been a recent
upsurge in scholarly interest not only in financial crises but also in the citizen revolts which
accompany them during crises of political representation. As discussed, these rebellions have
often  been led  by struggling  middle-class  sectors  and characterized  by horizontal  models  of
organising,  self-management  and  autonomous  movements  which  have  sought  to  avoid  co-
optation by political parties, trade unions and state institutions. These strategies were copied and
later featured in a range of national cases that have been described earlier. Argentina -whose
political and economic context is a decade further on from the post-2008 global crisis uprisings-
arouses considerable interest among the broader academic and activist community who wish to
draw  upon  comparative  research  that  provides  lessons  from  that  experience  of  citizen
mobilization and then demobilization. 
Whilst Latin Americanists, students and those interested in Argentina’s society are the prime
intended readership, this book is targeted beyond either such specialists or academia per se. The
monograph draws upon and compares several other national examples from the last two decades
to understand how contextual factors shape distinctive struggling middle-class citizen responses
to external shocks. It will therefore also be highly relevant to readerships across Europe, North
America and internationally. 
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Further,  the book is targeted towards both professional and lay readerships and will appeal to
postgraduate students, researchers of social change across a wide range of disciplines It will also
be  of  interest  to  social  movement  researchers,  Marxists  and other  theorists  of  radical  social
change and those involved in grassroots organising and labor activists.  It contributes towards
understanding how grievances that result from proletarianization following economic shocks can
become  politicized.  It  asks  how  such  citizens  make  decisions  are  made  about  whether  to
participate  in  economic  self-improvement  and  political  protest  actions  in  response  to  such
circumstances.   The  lack  of  research  in  this  area  can  be  explained  by  a  range  of  factors.
Principally, the nationally representative annual household survey data that is presently available
in different countries concentrates almost entirely on financial, consumer, employment (and to a
minor  extent)  social  activities  by  household  units,  without  asking  participants  about  their
participation  in  protest  actions  or  being able  to  analyze  what  the generative factors  are  that
impact  on  their  decision  to  join  them.   The  University  of  North  Carolina’s  Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey in Russia and the American Community Survey in the USA are cases in point.
Therefore quantitative measurement of how citizens respond to economic shocks in terms of
collective actions has proven difficult.
Secondly, the theoretical complexities involved in demarcating those households that one can
classify  as  belonging  to  a  ‘new  urban  poor’  social  stratum  within  large  and  nationally
representative  survey  datasets  have  militated  against  any  quantitative  studies  of  this  nature
having  been  conducted  before.  Indeed,  the  qualitative  characteristics  that  conceptually
distinguish  ‘new urban  poor’ households  from the  ‘structural  poor’ (who  have  unmet  basic
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needs) are often so profoundly obscured within the core data, that this fact alone has proven
sufficient to deter analyzes that are of a statistical complexion.  
An additional reason why the Argentinean case is especially useful to examine is that the World
Bank’s ISCA (Social Impact of the Crisis in Argentina) Survey (2002) is one of the few available
national household surveys that incorporates data on both self-help and protest actions in a post-
crisis situation.  This makes it a hugely valuable resource in terms of observing the full range of
possible responses to pauperization. 
Thirdly,  a  study  that  contains  a  significant  quantitative  component  in  terms  of  explaining
behavioral patterns of those who become impoverished, including their  participation in protest
actions  is  also  needed  to  consolidate  upon  and  frame  the  qualitative  research  that  has  been
conducted in a variety of disciplines that have explored individual responses to the crisis in terms
of their ‘coping strategies’.
Fourthly, whilst the overwhelming majority of qualitative studies that have been conducted into
how  households  and  citizens  cope  with  internal  or  external  economic  shocks  focus  on  the
structurally poor (usually in the least developed countries in the world), the few that have turned
their attention to non-structural “new” poverty have tended to treat the sample of their study as a
homogenous  social  group  which  is  usually  referred  to  rather  blandly  as  ‘the  middle  class,’
regardless of whether they actually experienced severe declines in living standards during these
economic  crises.   Scant  attention  is  paid  to  the  diversity  within  this  ‘class’ that  makes  the
nuanced responses of its members to such shocks so intriguing. This includes how hardship or a
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loss  of  status  affects  subjectivities  and how this  sometimes  induces  politicized  responses  or
collective  forms  of  action  from  affected  citizens.   Yet  it  is  precisely  this  ‘this  newly
impoverished’ stratum of the middle class whose collective responses should be of most interest
to theorists of social change and thus merit closer analysis. The experience of recent years since
the global crisis suggests that it is when they become proletarianized and construct alliances with
the  traditional  poor  and  working  class  then  take  action  alongside  them  within  popular
movements that their potential to change governments, influence policy changes or draw global
media attention is strongest.
In any case, the precise meaning of ‘the middle class’ is so vague that just who constitutes part of
it has been highly contested. In Argentina itself, this has been the case ever since Gino Germani
conducted the first  large-scale study of social  class in the country - ‘Estructura Social  en la
Argentina’ - in 1955 which inflated the size of the “middle class” as it included many working-
class occupations (Adamovsky, 2009), while the IMF’s own US$ 10 per day baseline is derided
by most sociologists. The polemic about its definition has also prevented a sizable number of
studies  about  the  middle  class  from  being  conducted,  especially  in  recent  years.  Notable
exceptions to this tendency to homogenize middle-class responses in Argentina include work by
Aguirre on new urban poor reticence towards enrolment in assistentialis8 aid programmes (2008),
Mazzoni’s publications on how a limited understanding of citizenship rights restricted new urban
poor political activism in the post-crisis period (2007, 2008) and, Kessler and Di Virgilio’s paper
on how the new urban poor utilize their social, cultural and human capital in different ways to
the structural poor when faced with material hardship (2008).  
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It should be noted that each of these contributions, whilst valuable in its own academic discipline,
make few connections between households’ economic coping strategies and how they interplay
with  the  decision  to  engage  in  political  protest  as  an  alternative  response.  Mazzoni’s (2007)
discussion of the impact that impoverishment had on beliefs about politics among the new urban
poor  during  Argentina’s post-crisis  period  is  an  exception.   Yet,  whilst  insightful,  she  neither
focuses on the process of their politicization, nor the empirical link between the self-improvement
and protest actions that they took in response. 
The prime focus of research into struggling or impoverished middle-class behavior until now has
been how they take financial, employment, entrepreneurial and lifestyle decisions, as opposed to
protest actions in response. This has been driven by the valid concern that national governments,
international financial institutions and NGO’s have neglected policy initiatives that are specifically
designed  to  support  those  who  have  recently  become  (or  are  vulnerable  to  becoming)  poor
(Kessler and Di Virgilio 2008) and have instead dedicated their efforts to confronting structural
poverty. However, although this preoccupation is valid in itself, it has tended to result in newly
poor citizens being understood as economic, benefit-maximising actors in terms of how they resist
their hardship, discounting the possibility that such citizens may develop a shared sense of identity
and forge collective grievances with them. Typically, the subsequent articulation of their political
demands is expressed through collective protest actions which target the government, judicial and
financial authorities. Thus it is necessary to recognize that economic processes cannot be divorced
from the social and political consequences that they generate.  Coping strategies of “economic”
resistance must be analyzed together with “political” resistance and protest. 
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This  study’s  perspective  follows  approaches  that  have  previously  documented  the  intrinsic
relationship between self-help and protest actions, for example in the UK (Croucher 1987) and
Soviet Union (Moskoff 1993).  In Argentina itself, Nancy Powers (1999) discussed how material
concerns become understood as a “political” problem when personal tolerance of impoverishment
declines.  This may happen when citizens are either unable to find sufficient economic coping
mechanisms to maintain a desired level of needs satisfaction (i.e. if these strategies are undermined
or unsuccessful), if one’s poverty is experienced more intensely (which invokes greater anger), or
when economic and political contexts shape citizens’ evaluation of their material interests.  
Further, when economic aspirations are frustrated and prolonged, or lifestyle sacrifices become
intolerable, citizens begin to examine the structural reasons for their descent, exorcize themselves
of culpability for their hardship and protest their condition instead. However, Powers’ research is
more  relevant  to  contexts  of  gradual  and atomized pauperization,  as  her  study of  Argentina’s
neoliberal reforms in the 1990s was. In contrast, the sudden mass pauperization like that which
exploded in 2001-02 was quite a different circumstance.  Further, like Mazzoni, Powers research is
limited in scope to how impoverishment impacts upon ‘political interests’ rather than involvement
in collective and protest action itself.
Finally, whilst the research focus in this book centres on the “new urban poor”, rural responses to
middle-class impoverishment in Argentina are investigated here for comparative purposes. This
comparison of rural-dwelling citizens’ collective action responses with those in the urban centres
has never been conducted before. 
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As the first English-language book that examines the waves of mobilization and demobilization
of Argentina’s struggling middle class, the results are based on the triangulation of data analysis
from  quantitative  surveys  and  fieldwork  interviews  with  non-activist  ‘average  citizens’,
academic  experts,  NGOs  and  social  movement  organisers  reflecting  back  on  their  different
degrees of participation (or non-participation) in the uprising of fifteen years ago. It is perhaps
methodologically even rarer to capture and analyze longitudinal data of both a quantitative and
qualitative nature over such a long time period, as the book seeks to do. 
The December 2001 revolt in Argentina captured the imaginations of sociologists and political
scientists both inside the country and internationally. It led to a flurry of scholarship (including in
English-language journals and volumes) which sought to explain the uprising and understand the
motivations for participation in a range of its nascent movements by certain sectors of society,
for  instance on the neighbourhood assemblies  (Svampa and Corral,  2006;  Dinerstein,  2003).
Others focused specifically on the motivations of middle-class citizens’ protest and solidarity
actions with working class and unemployed workers movements (Barbetta and Bidaseca, 2004)
and Briones and Mendoza’s (2003) work on women’s participation. Meanwhile, Armony and
Armony’s (2005) analyzed various political and economic factors which explain why citizens
engaged in mass mobilizations at the time, especially due to the collapse of the national myths of
grandeur and middle-class identity. However all of these sources only concentrate on the height
of  the  uprising  and  soon  after,  without  exploring  how demobilization  occurred  or  why this
solidarity largely eroded under the post-2003 milieu of economic and political ‘normalization’. 
Those which do seek to  do the latter  are  either  confined to  short  survey reports  (Centro de
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Estudios  Nueva  Mayoría’s,  2006),  or  they  were  written  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the
election of  the Nestor  Kirchner  government  (Petras,  2004).  However, these only explain the
short-term mobilization an demobilization phenomenon, rather than providing a longitudial study
from the vantage point of 15 years after the rebellion, which is one of the key objectives of this
book. 
Among the English-speaking literature,  several works were produced to explain the exciting,
organising models being used by social movements which originated from Argentina’s uprising
(Lopez-Levy, 2003; Sitrin, 2012). These focus on the structures and evolution of the organising
practices of the movements themselves without individuals’ political and financial trajectories or
oscillating degrees of participation in such movements being discussed.  Later monographs by
those  such  as  Olga  Onuch  (2014)  specifically  engaged  with  the  question  of  what  prompts
‘ordinary citizens’ to engage in mass uprisings, but is limited to qualitative interviews and focus
groups and focuses only on the moment of initial  rebellion in 2001-02, without framing the
question within a broader quantitative analysis to establish contextual trends. 
Yet amidst this body of work, the political dimension of pauperization or proletarianization and
how it is resisted by middle-class citizens through collective behavior and protest actions (during
economic crises and otherwise) has been largely neglected, despite calls to bestow it greater
attention  (Richards  and Gelleny, 2006).  A plethora  of  studies  on the  Indignado uprisings  in
Spain, the protests in Greece and other rebellions have been conducted in recent years but few
have concentrated  on how citizens  who face  sudden downward mobility  or  impoverishment
develop political agency or how their change in material conditions influenced their responses. In
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the Argentina context Mazzoni (2007) provides a rare and valuable exception. This monograph
seeks to build on Mazzoni’s research by exploring not just how impoverishment affected political
attitudes but also the collective and private behaviors that those in this proletarianized middle-
class stratum enacted in response. Indeed there are no studies that have sought to do this in
Argentina or otherwise which utilize empirical, mixed-methods longitudinal research that traces
the trajectories of citizens over two decades so as to understand these cycles of contention. 
Internationally, the post-2008 global crisis milieu presents a context of austerity, falling living
standards, a hollowing out of the middle class, stagnant social mobility and declining confidence
in political establishment.  How citizens -especially the struggling middle class- are responding
and will react in future is a key contemporary social problem which requires such a study. 
Methodology
A  Qualitative-Dominant,  Quantitative  Less-Dominant,  sequential  design  is  adopted  in  two
phases; drawing upon analysis  of World Bank (2002) and  Latinobarómetro (1995, 2002 and
2005) longitudinal household survey data along with participant interviews (at three points in
2007, 2011, 2016). In Phase 1, research draws upon evidence from two secondary sources.  The
first,  the  World-Bank  commissioned Impact  of  the  Social  Crisis  on Argentina (ISCA)  is  a
nationally  representative  household  survey of  9,209 individuals  in  2,800 households.  It  was
conducted  by  Public  Opinion,  Services  and Markets  -  OPSM  (an  Argentinian  marketing
consultancy)  in  2002.   The  survey’s  aim  was  to  understand  how  households  survived  the
country’s economic crisis and how it affected wellbeing.  
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However, for the purposes of this book, the core data was used specifically to: (a) Identify what
forms of resistance Argentinians who became poor during the crisis took.  (b) Examine how
decisions  about  whether  to  engage  in  collective  action  was  affected  by  differences  in  their
experiences of poverty, biographical histories and labor market position.  (c) Understand how
social attitudes and political perspectives informed their decision to adopt the actions identified
in the 2002 ISCA Survey.  This data was triangulated with that of a second, public opinion
survey from that same year, IPSOS-MORI’s  Latinobarómetro. This allowed the impact of the
following subjectivities on response to be determined (i) how the impoverished urban and rural
middle  class  felt  about  their  own  hardship  (ii)  the  extent  to  which  they  were  prepared  to
politically tolerate it and (iii) to what degree they felt that self-help opportunities existed that
they could exploit so as to overcome their poverty. 1995 Latinobarómetro Survey results were
also consulted to observe how newly poor Argentineans’ opinions changed between the 1990s
and the post-Argentinazo period in 2002, then in 2005, thus helping underpin how responses
changed over time. (iv) How and why middle-class characteristics, values, habitus and notions of
identity affected response.
The participants in the ISCA survey completed a closed questionnaire; once during May/June 2002
and then again during October/November the same year.  Its two data collection rounds enabled a
“new poor” or impoverished middle-class stratified sample to be obtained from within the core
data.  This was accomplished by first shortlisting all those individuals who lived in households
which had officially become “income poor” (whose monthly per capita income fell below $232
pesos or US $2 dollars per day – the 2002 national poverty line figure) during the five months
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between  each  data  collection  round.   Then  only  those  who  also  possessed  the  qualitative
characteristics that Minujín (1993) described in his conceptualization of new poverty (see Chapter
1)  were selected in  the final  sample,  including “basic  needs  coverage.”   In this  way the face
validity of the ‘new poor’ concept was preserved and “the impact of impoverishment” upon action
could be determined by comparing pre and post-pauperization responses during respective periods.
These characteristics included: a) They held a professional qualification, owned a small business,
had a university degree (or were currently studying for one) b) They were homeowners (or were
their adult children) and c) They had worked in a middle-class job or ran a business but had fallen
below the income poverty line during the 2001-02 crisis (or were adult children of those who did).
Criteria  a),  b)  and  c)  were  verified  during  an  initial  visit  to  the  residential  address  and  the
background pre-interview questionnaire information they supplied.  This left 314 cases in the final
sample.  
Two  important  data  limitations  exist.  First,  the  size  of  the  ‘new  poor’  sample  raised  the
methodological  problem that  the  results  were  susceptible  to  Type-II  errors  (by  which  a  null
hypothesis  is  falsely  accepted).  This  may  have  created  an  under-reporting  of  statistically
significant results.  Whilst this important data limitation is acknowledged, attempts were made to
mitigate it by measuring the outcome of test results at the 90% (rather than 95%) confidence level.
Secondly, the ISCA survey only recorded  formal ways of organising.  Therefore, important but
often illegal or informal activities like looting, criminal activity or graffiti were omitted, as were
common “legal” individual protest actions like signing petitions or letter writing, or untraceable
activities such as absenteeism. 
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In terms of the Latinobarómetro survey, its participants also completed closed questionnaires and
were asked to reflect upon the extent to which they were in agreement with a series of statements
about politics, institutions, economic models and so on.  It is important to highlight that this survey
does not record income data. Therefore, only participants whose subjective perception of their
circumstances was one of economic descent (and who possessed the three characteristics stipulated
above) were included in its new poor/impoverished middle-class sample.  Thus, the opinions of
those in this sample represent only an approximation of those of the “poverty-line defined” new
poor  sample  that  resulted  from  the  ISCA  Survey.  Of  the  1,200  adults  in  the  original
Latinobarómetro Survey, the new poor stratified sample obtained included 124 cases in 1995,
(10% of the sample universe) and 202 cases in 2002 (17%).
How  responses  were  classified  requires  some  elaboration.  Households  participate  in  any
particular action for a range of motivations.  For instance, some may have joined a barter club as
part of an idealistic project to help the community or even as a “protest” in itself , whereas others
may have done so purely due to individual survival needs.  However, in this book the responses
have been categorized in accordance with how they were clustered as variables by the ISCA
Survey’s designers (OPSM) in the original core data (see Table 1.1).  The initial experience of
pauperization during the start of the 2001 economic crisis destroyed the self-esteem of many
newly poor people as they lost the jobs that defined their sense of identity.  Many abandoned
hope of a brighter future during the descent from a comfortable lifestyle to one of economic
hardship, often for the first time in their lives.  The desire ‘to belong’ and have their talents
recognized by others again on the one hand, and the need to gain solace on the other, was what
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moved many to participate in collectivist actions like the cacerolazos,  barter clubs, assemblies,
worker-‘recovered’ factories and group therapy sessions (Svampa and Corral, 2006:138).  Often,
involvement in these actions also helped them to restore confidence in their own abilities and the
solidarity  that  the  struggling  middle  class  encountered  in  these  forums helped them to  ‘feel
euphoric to be part of a larger social movement in which they could establish new friendships
and become part of a ‘collective’.  
Data on voting behavior was the exception because it was not recorded by ISCA, but obtained
separately from Latinobarómetro.  Thus actions are regarded as “collective” if they involved a
“joint commitment” to a single outcome for multiple households, but whereby each played their
part in making it happen.  In other words, they are actions which are not reducible to individual
intentionality.  For instance, the goal of a ‘barter club’ is for multiple households to gain from it
because each relies on the production of goods and services by another, in order for the exchange
to  take  place.   In  cases  in  which  individual  households  pursue  their  particular  goals
independently (such as in the receipt of state aid), they are deemed to be ‘individual’ responses.
These  usually  occurred  in  physical  isolation  (like  an  office  or  voting  booth)  and  could  be
performed regardless of others’ involvement.  Whilst protest usually established some kind of
“self-improvement” as its goal, responses are classified in the latter way here only if they sought
immediate material enrichment.  If the desired improvements had to traverse a political stage
through the process of “demand-making” to some kind of authority, then they were categorized
as “protests.”
In  addition,  self-improvement  actions  are  categorized  here  as  only  those  that  encompass
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‘proactive’ strategies, in the sense that they either create additional resources for the household or
make increased use of their available physical, financial and human assets.  ‘Reactive’ strategies,
in which households respond by simply reducing consumption (Lokshin and Yemtsov, 2004), are
not considered in this research because on the one hand passively reducing one’s spending does
not constitute ‘self-improvement’ and on the other, from a policy perspective, what is of interest
is to observe how the new poor and middle class utilize their superior capital assets relative to
the structural poor - to enact strategies that enable them to escape poverty. 
This is not to say that pursuing economic coping strategies (self-improvement) or protest actions
are  mutually  exclusive.  Clearly  citizens  may  participate  in  both  simultaneously.  Nor  are
frustrated  attempts  to  achieve  self-help  the  only  reason  that  middle-class  citizens  confront
impoverishment  and  downward  social  mobility  through  protest  mobilizations.  Actors  may
instead cross the thresholds of social convention to openly defy the existing political authorities
due to a shared anticipation of either real or imagined losses or gains, compared to their current
conditions. As Armony and Armony assert (2005), citizens may act rationally, but their reference
points for responding to crisis are influenced by psychologically and culturally-framed cognitive
patterns, not only to deficits of political representation, weak institutionalization, or a dramatic
economic downturn, but also to a crisis of national identity conceptions (these will be explained
later).
A further linkage between the self-improvement and protest responses that will be analyzed in
this book is that under liberal-democratic regimes like Argentina, protest will only ever achieve
limited material  enrichment.  The  realm  of  legitimate  political  contestation  is  limited  to  the
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existing  boundaries  that  are  established  and  reproduced  through  the  system’s representative
structures, such as parliament, trade unions and lobby groups.  Politics is deemed to ‘happen’
only in these spaces and citizens are socialized into conforming to the status quo as liberal-
democratic  power  relations  become  naturalized  in  citizens’  minds  (Williams,  1977:100).
Therefore, after a certain period of protest and when concessions are gained, (or the movement is
defeated or dies away) the expectation is to resort to ‘self-improvement strategies’ in order to
achieve further material gain.  For these reasons neither protest nor are self-improvement actions
usually sufficient to satisfy material wants on their own. The decision to participate in either one
or the other can be dependent on how effective involvement in the alternative has been. 
Table 1.1 – Classification of Different Response Actions in Argentina During 2002
<TABLE 1.1 HERE>
Source: Ozarow, 2014:190
Phase 2, consisted of three periods of fieldwork in Argentina. These were performed in 2007,
2011 and 2016. Several research methods were triangulated. The author conducted participant
observation through embeddedness  in  middle-class  citizens’ local  communities,  working and
social lives. Systems of meanings participants attached to a variety of research themes mentioned
earlier were noted and interpreted. 
Concurrently, interviews were conducted in Spanish with 30 middle-class citizens (13 men and
17 women) from households that had become impoverished during the 2002 crisis. Permission
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was granted to access the anonymized ISCA database. Those initially selected for interview were
contacted by OPSM to request permission to disclose their details. Six were aged 20-29, six 30-
39, four 40-49, ten 50-59 and four 60+. Only three were political activists. These were voice-
recorded and responses and observations were then thematically analyzed. Respondents were
sampled purposively to ensure participation from middle-class people of different ages, genders,
locations and situations. All but one of the interview participants had white, European ancestry.
This is unsurprising. Two thirds of Argentinians possess such ethnic origins (Avena et al., 2012)
but  the  proportion  within  the  middle  class  is  higher  still  (Adamovsky, 2009).  Self-selection
problems  were  avoided  as  only  one  qualifying  participant  declined  to  be  interviewed.
Interviewees were given pseudonyms to protect their anonymity. Respondent details are given in
the Appendix. 
The same households  were  returned to  each time (where  possible,  as  some limited  attrition
occurred).  Most of those respondents who were not formally interviewed in the third round due
to resource constraints corresponded with me by e-mail. Expert interviews were also conducted
with ten academics, politicians and NGO coordinators (which provided welfare and employment
services to jobless professionals).  Home visits were made to gentrified districts of five large
cities – Buenos Aires, La Plata, Rosario, Santa Fe and Posadas– and Piedras Blancas, a rural
village in Entre Rios Province. Interviews usually occurred in participants’ homes to minimize
potential anxiety and embarrassment given the sensitive subject matter. No financial incentive
was  offered,  although  a  small  gift  was  offered  after  interviews.  The  30  semi-structured
interviews each lasted approximately 90 minutes.
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Interviewing vulnerable individuals may encourage them to underplay or exaggerate problems to
elicit sympathy. Measures were taken to manage these possibilities. Advice about interviewing
Argentinians in this situation was kindly provided by Isidro Adúriz, ex-Director of OPSM. I told
interview participants about my own Argentinian relations who had experienced the 2001 crisis
to  make them aware that  I  had some prior  knowledge of the situation’s realities.  As a non-
Argentinian, I was surprized at participants’ frankness, but discerned through a range of explicit
and implicit indications that being viewed as ‘an outsider’ was useful in this regard. 
Organization of this book and its main arguments
This book is composed in the following way: Chapter 1 has provided a background into the
global economic crisis, the growing crisis of political representation and how broad sectors of the
middle class, especially in North America and Europe have become subject to downward social
mobility, proletarianization and mass pauperization. How such citizens should be understood as
political agents who have resisted their condition through demand-making and collective protest
in several national contexts since the 2008 global crisis is discussed. They do not behave as
purely  rational  economic  actors.  The economic and political  crisis  in  Argentina 2001/2 as  a
paradigmatic case study for analysing middle-class resistance was introduced, and the study’s
methodology was outlined.
In Chapter 2, some of the key concepts in the monograph are developed. The origins of new
urban poverty (middle-class impoverishment) and their downward mobility as a consequence of
neoliberalism and processes of structural adjustment of its “losers,” following the Washington
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Consensus Reforms in the 1990s are discussed with reference to European and North America,
as well as Latin American and Argentina. Other manifestations of it, either following the 2008
global crises, as a characteristic of the transition economies from communism to capitalism, or in
post-apartheid societies are also observed. 
Cross-national  comparisons  are  made  between  the  how the  middle  class  resisted  crisis  and
hardship in Russia (1990s transition to capitalism and 1998 financial crisis), South Africa (post-
Apartheid), Argentina (post-2001 crisis), Iceland, Greece and Spain (post-2008 crisis) during the
past three decades, and whether citizens coped privately or participated in collective protests as a
consequence are examined. The chapter ends by articulating the book’s Gramscian theoretical
framework and how his concepts of ‘hegemony,’ ‘ideology’ and ‘false consciousness’ will be
adopted to help to account for how proletarianized citizens responded to their social descent in
Argentina since the 1990s. 
Chapter 3 is dedicated entirely to our Argentina case study and the research findings. It is divided
into two parts. The first section covers the period 1989-2000, incorporating the literature and
Latinobarómetro data analysis. It argues that the incremental nature of pauperization, relatively
stable macroeconomic environment and dominant discourses which atomized and individualized
one’s personal  financial  circumstances  meant  that  impoverishment  was  experienced more  in
isolation.  The  result  was  a  tendency  to  seek  self-help  solutions  to  their  circumstances  and
principally private ones at that. Whilst labor and social protests were regular, the involvement of
the struggling middle class tended to be organized ‘from above’ and ‘formally,’ principally via
white-collar trade unions or the representative organizations of small businesses. 
42
The second part is based upon an examination of World Bank and Latinobarómetro survey data
and covers the period 2001-02. The generative factors that explain why citizens mobilized to join
the revolt and how questions of a growing collective identity, grievance forming and the loss of
hegemonic consent to rule by the dominant class contributed to this tendency. 
How changes in citizens’ attitudes and subjectivities induced a shift in the tendency from ‘self-
blame under Menemismo’ in the 1990s to ‘system attribution’ for their circumstances in 2001-02
helps  to  explain  how  hegemonic  control  crumbled  are  described,  such  that  the  neoliberal
economic and liberal democratic order faced a severe challenge from the bourgeoning multi-
sectoral protest movement in 2001. Within the struggling middle class, we then examine which
biographical  characteristics  help  explain  the  tendency  for  some  citizens  to  join  protest
movements, while others desist from doing so. 
In Chapter 4, results are triangulated from Latinobarómetro Survey data (2005) and three sets of
in-depth interviews (2007, 2011 and 2016) to explore the demobilization and remobilization of
Argentina’s struggling middle class between 2003 and 2018. Four separate periods are identified;
First  the  post-2001  crisis  appeasement  and  demobilization  of  the  first  two  years  of  Nestor
Kirchner’s  government  (2003-2005).  Secondly,  the  sporadic  outbursts  of  rebellion  that
characterised the latter half of Nestor’s government and the first term of Cristina’s following the
Blumberg protests and Countryside Conflict (2006-2011). Thirdly, that of Cristina’s second term,
when the middle class commenced a series of mass mobilizations against her government (2012-
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2015). Then fourthly, the first two years of Mauricio Macri’s government (2016-2018) which
sparked the largest, most multi-sectoral protests since 2001. 
Finally, based upon the findings of our Argentina case study, we draw tentative conclusions abut
why struggling middle-class citizens are moobilized and de-mobilized, and what lessons may be
provided  for  and from other  national  contexts.  A theoretical  framework is  offered  to  try  to
explain how struggling middle-class citizens take decisions about whether to engage in protest or
self-improvement actions when faced with hardship, and whether these actions are conducted
collectively or privately. Suggestions are made as to how it could be adapted and applied in other
national contexts. We posit that to effect profound and lasting social change, the middle class
must enter into multisectoral alliances and that sustainable mobilising vehicles must be created,
so as to maintain radical action beyond periods of crisis. 
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1 In this book the ‘middle class’ is largely analyzed subjectively as a political identity, rather than an objectively-
defined social class with established boundaries. However, in terms of the empirical work referred to later, it is deemed
to consist of highly-educated professionals, middle managers, small business owners or skilled white-collar workers or
who are home owners. It is proposed later that whilst many of those who suffered downward mobility during the 2001-
02 economic crisis re-joined the middle class during the post-2003 economic recovery, a significant proportion were
also permanently proletarianized.
2 The Arab Spring protests principally demanded political freedoms and end to dictatorship rather than being a reaction
against austerity measures. However, they did include a significant ‘squeezed’ middle-class presence, especially well-
educated young adults who, analysts claim, were inspired to revolt by their limited prospects for upward social mobility
(Mason, 2012).
3The two trade union confederations, the CGT and rival  Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina (CTA) organized a
General Strike on 13th December 2001 but were not formally involved in coordinating the cacerolazos, which occurred
without any formal degree of organization.
4 Often used to describe the social uprisings that occurred during 19 th and 20thDecember 2001. However, it should be
noted that the term is often deliberately avoided by left-wing scholars for its exaggerated and misleading revolutionary
and spontaneous signifiers. The uprisings had their roots in a series of territorialized protests against neo-liberalism in




7 The CGT is the largest trade union confederation in Argentina. Its three factions provisionally reunified in July 2016.
The CTA itself split into two factions, CTA de los Trabajadores and the CTA Autónoma.
8 From the Spanish asistencialismo. Describes paternalistic, passive forms of aid.
References
Adamovsky, Ezequiel (2009) Historia de la Clase Media Argentina. Buenos Aires, Planeta.
Aguirre, Patricia (2008) ‘Social assistance as seen by the Buenos Aires poor and new urban poor
during Convertibility’, Anthropology of Food [Online], 4 May 2008
Ainsworth,  Susan and Cynthia  Hardy. 2009.  ‘Mind over  body:  Physical  and psychotherapeutic
discourses and the regulation of the older worker.’ Human Relations 62(8): 1199-1229
Astarita, Ronaldo. (2008) ‘La peligrosa ilusión del poder dual en la actual situación política.’ 
Buenos Aires
Avena Sergio, Via M, Ziv E, Pérez-Stable EJ, Gignoux CR, Dejean C (2012) ‘Heterogeneity in 
genetic admixture across different regions of Argentina.’ PLoS One vol. 7
Blagrave, Patrick and Davide Furceri (2015) “IMF Survey : Lower Potential Growth: A New 
Reality”. Washington DC: IMF Research Department
Chomsky, Noam (2012) Occupy. London: Penguin
Croucher, Richard (1987) We Refuse to Starve in Silence: A History of the National Unemployed 
Workers’ Movement, 1920-46, London, Lawrence & Whithart Ltd
Dagdeviren, Hulya; Donoghue, Matthew; Meier, Lars (2017) “The narratives of Hardship: The new
and the old poor in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis in Europe.” Sociological Review, Vol. 65,
No. 2, pp.369-385
Della Porta,  Donna et al.  (eds) (2017)  Late Neoliberalism and its Discontents in the Economic
Crisis  Comparing  Social  Movements  in  the  European  Periphery.  New  York:  Palgrave
Macmillan
Dinerstein, Ana (2003) ‘¡Qué se vayan todos! Popular Insurrection and the Asambleas Barriales in
Argentina,’ Bulletin of Latin American Research Vol. 22 (2)
Eghbal,  Media.  (2008)  ‘Inflation  and  stagnant  wages  squeeze  Western  Europe’s middle  class’,
Euromonitor International, 23rd June 2008 
Eurostat (2018) “Eurostat (2016). “People at risk of poverty or social exclusion”. Luxembourg: 
European Commission
Davies, James C. (1962) “Toward a Theory of Revolution” American Sociological Review, 27(1): 
5–19.
Feijóo,  del  Carmen,  M.  (2003)  Nuevo  País,  Nueva  Pobreza,  Buenos  Aires,  Fondo  de  Cultura
Económica
Gabriel Yiannis, David Gray and Harshita Goregaokar. 2013. ‘Job Loss and its Aftermath among
Managers and Professionals:  Wounded, Fragmented and Flexible.’  Work, Employment and
Society 27 (1): 56-72.
Galbraith, John K. (1992) The Culture of Contentment, New York, Houghton Mifflin
Gomez,  Georgina  and  Helmsing,  A.  (2008)  ‘Selective  spatial  closure  and  Local  Economic
Development:  What  do  we  learn  from  the  Argentinean  local  currency  systems?’  World
Development Vol. 36, (11) pp. 2489–2511
Grimson,  Alejandro  and  Kessler,  Gabriel  (2005)  On  Argentina  and  the  Southern  Cone:
Neoliberalism and National Imaginations, Abingdon, Routledge
Hirschman, Albert (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations
and States, Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press
INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos) http://www.indec.gov.ar
International  Monetary  Fund  (2015)  IMF  Survey:  Lower  Potential  Growth:  A New  Reality.
Washington DC, IMF.  
Kanya,  Adam  (1997).  ‘The  Politics  of  Redress:  South  African  Style  Affirmative  Action.’ The
Journal of Modern African Studies, (35), pp. 231-249 
Katzman, Ruben (1989) ‘La heterogeneidad de la pobreza. El caso de Montevideo,’ Revista de la
CEPAL, Santiago de Chile, no. 37, April 1989, pp. 141-152
Kessler, Gabriel. and Di Virgilio, María (2008) ‘La nueva pobreza urbana: dinámica global, regional
y argentina en las últimas dos décadas’, Revista de la CEPAL (95), August 2008, pp.31-50
Lokshin, Michael and Yemtsov, Ruslan (2004) ‘Household Strategies of Coping with Shocks in
Post-crisis Russia’, Review of Development Economics 8 (1), pp. 15-32
Mandemakers, Jornt and Monden, Christiaan (2013). ‘Does the Effect of Job Loss on Psychological
Distress Differ by Educational Level?’ Work, Employment and Society 27 (1). pp.73-93.
Mason, Paul (2012) Why it’s Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions, London, Verso
Masseroni,  Susana  and  Sauane,  Susana  (2002)  ‘Psychic  and  Somatic  Vulnerability  Among
Professional Middle-Class Women in Argentina’, Journal of Developing Societies, vol. 18, (2-
3) pp.59-80
Mazzoni,  Maria  (2007)  ‘Política  y  Empobrecimiento,’  Revista  de  la  Facultad  (13),  Argentina,
Universidad Nacional de Comahue pp.185-211
----  (2008) ‘Ciudadanos de  bajo  impacto,’  Revista de la  Facultad  (14),  Argentina,  Universidad
Nacional, Comahue pp.211-225
Minujín Alberto Beccaria Luis and Bustelo,  Eduardo (1993)  Cuesta abajo: Los nuevos pobres:
efectos de la crisis en la sociedad argentina, Unicef/Losada
Minujín Alberto (2007) Vulnerabilidad y resiliencia de la clase media en América Latina, The New
School, New York
Moskoff, William (1992)  Impoverishment and Protest in the Perestroika Years. Washington DC:
NCSEER
Nemirovsky, Irene (2007) French Suite, New York, Vintage Books
Nueva Mayoría (2006) ‘La desaparición de los cacerolazos, las asambleas populares, y el fenómeno
del trueque, tras la salida de la crisis 2001-02.’ Buenos Aires, Centro de Estudios Nueva 
Mayoría.
Ozarow, Daniel (2014) 'When all they thought was solid melted into air: Resisting pauperisation in 
Argentina during the 2002 economic crisis' Latin American Research Review 49 (1) pp.178-
202
----- (2015) ‘Joblessness and underemployment among the middle class in post-crisis Argentina: 
Superior capital possession as a poisoned chalice,’ Latin American Studies Association 
XXXIII International Congress, Puerto Rico, 28th May 2015 
Parkinson, John R. (2012) Democracy and Public Space: The Physical Sites of Democratic 
Performance, Oxford, Oxford University Press
Phelps Brown, Henry (1990) ‘The Counter-Revolution of Our Time’, Industrial Relations: A 
Journal of Economy and Society, Vol. 29 (1), pp. 1-14
Phillips, Leigh (2008) 'Sarkozy fears spectre of 1968 haunting Europe'. EUobserver. 23rd December 
2008
Powers, Nancy (1999) ‘Coping with economic hardship in Argentina: How material interests affect
individuals’ political interests’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, pp.521-549
Richards, David and Gelleny, Richard (2006) ‘Banking Crises, Collective Protest and Rebellion,’
Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39 (4), December 2006, pp.777-801
Rock, David (1991) ‘Argentina 1930-46,’ in Bethell, L. (1991)  The Cambridge History of Latin
America, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 8, p.69
Sitrin, Marina (2012) Everyday Revolutions: Horizontalism and Autonomy in Argentina. Zed Books
South African Institute of Race Relations (2006) White Emigration from South Africa 1995-2005.
77th Annual Report. Johannesburg.
Svampa,  Maristella  and  Corral,  Damian  (2006)  ‘Political  Mobilization  in  Neighborhood
Assemblies’ in  Epstein,  E.  and Pion-Berlin,  D.  (eds.)  Broken Promises? The Argentinean
Crisis and Argentinean Democracy, New York, Lexington Books, pp.117-141
Svampa, Maristella (2005) La Sociedad excluyente. La Argentina bajo el signo del neoliberalismo.
Buenos Aires: Taurus
----- (2012) ‘Negro sobre blanco,’ Perfil, 16th September 2012 
Velázquez, Ayelén (Dir) (2017) 39 El Documental, Las Victimas de 2001. 95 mins. 
Wade, Robert. (2009a) ‘Iceland as Icarus’, Challenge Magazine, vol 52 (3), May/June 2009, pp.5-
33
------ (2009b) ‘From global imbalances to global reorganizations’, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 33 (4) pp. 539–562
Warren,  Elizabeth.  (2007) ‘The Coming Collapse of the Middle Class’,  The Graduate Council,
California, University of California – Berkeley
Weiner, Richard R. and Ivan López (2018) Los Indignados: Tides of Social Insertion in Spain. Zero
Books: Winchester, UK
Williams, Raymond (1977) Marxism and Literature, Oxford, Oxford University Press
Willie,  Anchrit  (2001) ‘Political  Responses  to  Dissatisfaction in  Russia’,  Journal  of  Happiness
Studies, vol. 2 (2), November 2001, Springer, pp.205-235
World Bank (2002) Impact of the Social Crisis on Argentina Survey (ISCA) 
http://go.worldbank.org/D78TBTCP80 Last accessed 12/10/2018
Zurawicki, Leon and Braidot, Nestor (2005) ‘Consumers during crisis: responses from the middle 
class in Argentina,’ Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol 58(8), Aug 2005, pp.1100-9
